ANCIENT TIMES

A History of the Early World

PART II

by

James Henry Breasted

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PREFACE

In the selection of subject matter as well as in style and diction, it has been the purpose of the author to make this book sufficiently simple to be put into the hands of first-year high-school pupils. A great deal of labor has been devoted to the mere task of clear and simple statement and arrangement. While simple enough for first-year high-school work, it nevertheless is planned to interest and stimulate all students of high-school age. In dealing with each civilization a sufficient framework of political organization and of historical events has been laid down; but *the bulk of the space has been devoted to the life of man in all its manifestations*—society, industry, commerce, religion, art, literature. These things are so presented as to make it clear how one age grows out of another, and how each civilization profits by that which has preceded it.

The story of each great race or nation is thus clearly disengaged and presented in period after period; but, nevertheless, the book purposes to present the career of man as a whole, in a connected story of expanding life and civilization from the days of the rudest stone hatchet to the Christian cathedrals of Europe, without a serious gap. A symmetrical presentation of the career of man requires adequate space for the origins of civilization and the history of the Orient, as these two subjects have been revealed by the excavations and discoveries of the last two generations, especially the last twenty-five years. The reasons for devoting more than the customary space to these subjects in this book may therefore be briefly noted.

The length of the career of man discernible by us has been

enormously increased at the present day by archæological discovery, carrying back the development of human arts at least fifty, and perhaps two hundred thousand, years. Even as recorded in *written* documents, modern discovery in the Orient has placed behind the period of human history as formerly known to us another period equally long, thus doubling the length of the historic age. It cannot be said that all this vast new outlook has as yet been surveyed and briefly presented in a form intelligible to younger students as an imposing panorama of the expanding human career. The attainment of such a point of view of the career of man has been a slow process. The ancient history written by Sulpicius Severus, about 400 A.D., survived for over a thousand years, and became a respected textbook, which was in use as late as the sixteenth century. It dealt almost exclusively with the history of Rome. A mention of the battle of Marathon was its *only reference* to Greek history. The Roman colossus bulked so large that nothing earlier could be seen behind it.

Within the last few years, however, the marvelous genius of the Greeks has finally found full recognition in our historical textbooks. There is another similar step yet to be taken, and that is to discern behind Greece and Rome an additional great and important chapter of the human story and to give it adequate and interesting presentation to young readers. Probably no one outside the arcanum of the traditional classicists would question the assertion that conquests which we owe to the Orient, like the discovery of metal and the invention of alphabetic writing, were achievements of far greater importance than the details of the Peloponnesian Wars, whether estimated by their consequences to the human race or by their value as information in the mind of the modern high-school pupil. Whether such achievements are regarded as falling within the historic epoch or not is a matter of small moment. They belong to the *human career,* and as such they should find their place in the picture of that career which is presented to the younger generation.

The intelligent person of today desires to be so familiar with such facts as these in the rise of civilization as to possess some moderate acquaintance with the early chapters in the human career. Civilization arose in the Orient, and early Europe obtained it there. But the languages of the early Orient perished, and the ability to read them was lost many centuries ago. On the other hand, the languages of Greece and Rome were never lost, like those of the ancient Orient. In modern educational history Greek and Latin have not been suddenly recovered, and we have not had to grow accustomed to their abrupt introduction into science and education. The sudden and dramatic recovery of the earlier chapters of the human career, lying behind Greece and Rome, has created a situation to which our histories of the ancient world, as they are found in our public schools, have not yet adjusted themselves. The habit of regarding ancient history as beginning with Greece has become so fixed that it is not easily to be changed. Furthermore, the monuments and documents left us by the ancient Orient are far larger in extent than those which we have inherited from Greece and Rome together, and their enormous volume, together with their difficult systems of writing, have made it very laborious to recover and arrange the history of the Orient in form and language suitable for the high-school pupil.

In 1884 Eduard Meyer, the leading ancient historian of this generation, in his *History of Antiquity* devoted six hundred and nineteen pages to the Orient. In the third edition, still unfinished, which began to appear in 1913, the portion of the Orient thus far issued (less than half) occupies eleven hundred and fifty pages. The remainder, still unpublished, will easily bring the treatment of the Orient up to twenty-four or twenty-five hundred pages, that is, about four times its former bulk. A textbook which devotes a brief fifty- or sixty-page introduction to the Orient and begins "real history" with the Greeks is not proportioned in accordance with modern knowledge of the ancient world.

Furthermore, the value of the early oriental monuments

as teaching material has as yet hardly been discerned. The highly graphic pictorial monuments and records of the East, when accompanied by proper explanations, may be made to convey to the young student the meaning and character of a contemporary historical source more vividly than any body of ancient records surviving elsewhere. When adequately explained, such records also serve to dispel that sense of complete unreality which besets the young person in studying the career of ancient man. These materials have not been employed in our schools, because they have not been available to the teacher in the current textbooks.

Finally, when we recall that the leading religion of the world—the one which still dominates Western civilization today—came to us out of the Orient; when we further remember that before it fell the Roman Empire was completely orientalized, it would appear to be only fair to our schools to give them books furnishing an adequate treatment of pre-Greek civilization. This does not mean to question for a moment the undeniable supremacy of Greek culture, or to give it any less space than before. The author believes that no one who reads the chapters on Greece in this survey will gain the impression that Hellas has been sacrificed to Moloch—in other words, to her oriental predecessors.

The author is convinced that the surviving monuments of the entire ancient world can be so visualized as to render ancient history a very real story even to young students, and that these monuments may be made to tell their own story with great vividness. This method he has already introduced into the ancient-history chapters of *Outlines of European History, Part I* where it has demonstrated its availability. The same method has been employed in illustrating this ancient history. The result has been a book somewhat larger than the current textbooks on ancient history; but the excess is due to the series of illustrations. The book actually contains a text of about five hundred pages, with a "picture book" of about two hundred and fifteen pages. Teachers will do well

to make the illustrations and accompanying descriptive matter part of each lesson. The references in the text to the illustrations, and the references to the text in the descriptive matter under the illustrations, if noted and used, will be found to merge text and illustrations into a unified whole. It should be noted that all references to the text are by paragraph (§) except a few references by "Section."

An elaborate system of maps has been arranged by the author for the purpose of bringing the successive epochs of history before the pupil in terms of geography. The underlying principle is the arrangement on the same plate of from two to four maps representing successive historical epochs. It is believed that these composite maps, called by the author sequence maps, will prove a powerful aid to the teacher.

The author has not found it an easy task to turn from twenty-five years of research in a laboratory of ancient history, extending from a university post in America to the frontiers of the oriental lands, and endeavor to summarize for youthful readers the facts now discernible in the career of ancient man. Under these circumstances the experience of my friend Professor James Harvey Robinson, who has done so much for the study of history in the schools of America, has been invaluable. The book owes a great deal to the inspiration of his unflagging interest and the helpfulness of his long experience in the art of simplification. It may be mentioned here that Professor Robinson's *Medieval and Modern Times* forms the continuation of this volume on ancient history. To my colleague Professor C. F. Huth also I am indebted for careful reading of the proofs, accompanied by unfailingly valuable counsel. Mr. Robert I. Adriance, head of the history department of the East Orange high schools, has kindly read all the proofs. His discerning criticisms and wide knowledge have proved very valuable to the book, and his unfailing interest has been a great encouragement.

JAMES HENRY BREASTED

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


Plate IV. A Corner of the Parthenon

Looking through the Doric colonnades as they are to-day, at the southeast corner of the building, to the distant hills of Hymettus. On the left is the base of the wall of the interior, destroyed by the explosion of a Turkish powder magazine ignited by a Venetian shell in 1687, when the entire central portion of the building was blown out. At the top of this wall was the frieze of Phidias (Figure 186 and §577).



CHAPTER XVI

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA AND THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

57. THE TYRANNY OF ATHENS AND THE SECOND PELOPONNESIAN WAR

§587. States of the Athenian Empire become helpless subjects

While Athens under the guiding hand of Pericles had thus made herself the chief center of refined and civilized life in the Greek world, her political situation was in a number of ways becoming a serious one both within and without her empire. When the danger from Persia had long

NOTE. The above headpiece shows us the lovely little Temple of Victory, still standing on the Acropolis (*B* in Figure 183). It was demolished by the Turks, who built a battery out of its blocks. When the Turkish works were cleared away in 1835, the fragments of the temple were discovered and it was put together again. The roof, however, is still lacking (but see *D* in restoration, page 385). It was probably built, or at least begun, in the latter part of the leadership of Pericles. The columns display the incoming Ionic form (Figure 184) and are among the most beautiful examples of this style, or, as it is commonly called, "order."

passed and some of the island states of the Empire wished to withdraw, Athens would not permit them to do so. She sent out her war fleet, conquered the rebellious islands, and forced them to pay money tribute instead of contributing ships. Often many of their citizens were driven out and their lands were divided among the Athenian settlers. A section of the Athenian fleet was on constant duty to sail about in the Ægean and collect the tribute money by force (see map II, page 391). These funds were used by Athens as she pleased, and the magnificent buildings of Pericles were paid for out of this tribute.

§588. Change in the policy of Athens regarding citizenship

Moreover, the democracy of Athens was most undemocratic in its treatment of these outsiders in the other cities of the Empire. For, about the middle of the century the Athenians, led by Pericles, abolished the former liberal policy of granting citizenship to outsiders (§536) and passed a very strict law limiting Athenian citizenship to those whose parents were themselves citizens of Athens. This law kept the people of the Empire really foreigners and deprived Athens of the large body of loyal citizens which she might have gained from among the subject cities.

§589. Tyranny of Athens and discontent in her empire

At the same time Athens forced the people of the Empire to come there to settle their legal differences before her citizen-juries. For this purpose the people of distant island states were often obliged to make the expensive and inconvenient journey to Athens. There was no feeling of unity within the Empire, for the Council of representatives from the states of the Empire, which once guided its affairs, no longer held any meetings. Athens was in complete control and governed them as she liked. They saw how much easier were the conditions under which the members of the Spartan League lived, and more than one of them sent secret messages to Sparta, with the purpose of throwing off Athenian control and going over to Sparta.

§590. Hostility of the rivals of Athens

While such was the state of affairs within the Athenian Empire, conditions outside were even more serious. The outward splendor of Athens, her commercial prosperity,

the visible growth of her power, her not very conciliatory attitude toward her rivals, and the example she offered of the seeming success of triumphant democracy—all these things were causes of jealousy to a backward and conservative military State like Sparta, where most of the citizens were still unable to read, iron money continued in use, and the town remained an open settlement without walls or defenses (Figure 178). Moreover, this feeling of unfriendliness toward Athens was not confined to Sparta but was quite general throughout Greece. The merchants of Corinth (Figure 163) found Athenian competition a continuous vexation, and when Athenian possessions in the north Ægean revolted and received support from Corinth and Sparta, the fact that hardly half of the thirty years' term of peace (§545) had expired did not prevent the outbreak of war.



Figure 190. Monument Commemorating the Triumph of an Athenian Citizen in Music

An entire street of Athens was filled with such monuments (§583). We learn the name of the citizen, Lysicrates, who erected this beautiful monument, from the inscription it still bears, which reads: "Lysicrates . . . was choragus [leader of the chorus] when the boy-chorus of the tribe of Akamantis won the prize; Theon was a flute-player, Lysiades of Athens trained the choir. Euaenetus was archon." The archon's name dates the erection of the monument for us in 335 to 334 B.C. Beyond the monument we look westward to the back of the Acropolis (see plan, page 401).

It seemed as if all European Greece not included in the Athenian Empire had united against Athens, for Sparta controlled the entire

§591. Opening of Second Peloponnesian War (431 B.C.) and Pericles' plan of campaign

Peloponnesus except Argos, and north of Attica, Bœotia led by Thebes, as well as its neighbors on the west, were hostile to Athens. The support of Athens consisted of the Ægean cities which made up her empire and a few outlying allies of little power. She began the struggle with a large war treasury and a fleet which made her undisputed mistress of the sea. But she could not hope to cope with the land forces of the enemy, which, some thirty thousand strong, had planned to meet in the Isthmus in the spring of 431 B.C. Accordingly, Pericles' plan for the war was to throw all the resources of Athens into naval enterprises and make no effort to defend Attica by land. When the Peloponnesian army entered Attica the country communities were directed by Pericles to leave their homes and take refuge in the open markets and squares of Athens, the sanctuaries, and especially between the Long Walls leading to the Piræus. Here they were safe behind the strong defenses of Athens and her port. To offset the devastation of Attica by the Spartan army, all that Athens could do was to organize destructive sea raids and inflict as much damage as possible along the coasts of the Peloponnesus or blockade and destroy Corinthian commerce as of old (map II, page 391).

§592. The plague in Athens

The masses of people crowded within the walls of Athens under the unsanitary conditions we have already described (§551), exposed the city to disease; a plague, brought in from the Orient, raged with intermissions for several seasons. It carried off probably a third of the population, and from this unforeseen disaster Athens never recovered. Constantly under arms for the defense of the walls, deprived of any opportunity to strike the enemy, forced to sit still and see their land ravaged, the citizens at last broke out in discontent.

§593. Decline and fall of Pericles

Even before the beginning of the war there had been signs that the power of Pericles was waning. He was a thoroughly modern man, associated openly with the Sophists, and very evidently held their views. We can understand what this meant to the people, if we imagine one of our own political leaders of to-day declaring himself

an infidel.[63] One of Pericles' particular friends among the Sophists had been prosecuted by the people for irreligious views (§563). He was legally condemned for his infidelity and, in spite of all that Pericles could do, was obliged to flee from Athens. At the same time a popular attack on the honesty of Pericles' friend Phidias, the great sculptor, resulted in his being thrown into prison, where he died. Finally, Pericles himself lost control, was tried for misappropriation of funds, and fined.



Figure 191. Greek Youth Reading from a Roll

It will be seen that the young man holds the roll so that he rolls up a portion of it with one hand as he unrolls another portion with the other. He soon has a roll in each hand, while he holds smoothly stretched out between the two rolls the exposed portion from which he reads a column of writing like that which we see photographed from the oldest-preserved Greek book (roll), in Figure 223. Such a column formed for him a page, but when it was read, instead of turning a page as we do, he rolled it away to the left side, and brought into view a new column from the other roll on the right side.

§594. Restoration and death of Pericles (429 B.C.)

The absence of his steadying hand and powerful leadership was at once felt by the people, for there was no one to take his place, although a swarm of small politicians were contending for control of the Assembly. Realizing their helplessness the people soon turned to Pericles again and elected him strategus. But the great days of his leadership were over. His two sons died of the plague. Then he was himself stricken with it and died soon after his return to power (429 B.C.). Great statesman as he was, he had left Athens with a system of government which did not provide for the continuation

[63] Those who remember Robert G. Ingersoll will recall that he sacrificed a political career because of his religious views.

of such leadership as he had furnished, and without such leadership the Athenian Empire was doomed.

§595. Lack of leaders after death of Pericles

Men of the prosperous manufacturing class now came to the fore. They possessed neither the high station in life, the ability as statesmen, nor the qualities of leadership to win the confidence and respect of the people. Moreover, these new leaders were not soldiers and could not command the fleet or the army as Pericles had done. The most notable exception was Alcibiades, a brilliant young man, a relative of Pericles and brought up in his house. The two legal sons of Pericles (there was another son by an illegal marriage, §614) having died, Alcibiades, if he had enjoyed the guidance of his foster father a few years longer, might have become the savior of Athens and of Greece. As it happened, however, this young leader was more largely responsible than anyone else for the destruction of the Athenian Empire and the downfall of Greece.

§596. Unstable leadership of the Assembly

Lacking the steadying hand of a statesman whose well-formed plans and continuous policy might furnish a firm and guiding influence, the management of Athenian affairs fell into confusion. Wavering and changeableness were rarely interrupted by any display of stability, firmness, and wisdom; the leaders drifted from one policy to another, and usually from bad to worse. It seemed impossible to regain stable leadership. The youthful Aristophanes (§659) pictured the rudderless condition of the ship of State in one clever comedy after another, in which he ridiculed in irresistible satire the pretense to statesmanship of such "men of the people" as Cleon the tanner.

§597. Incident of Mitylene

A typical example of the ill-considered actions of the Assembly was their treatment of the revolting citizens of Mitylene. When the men of Mitylene were finally subdued, the Assembly on the Pnyx (Figure 179) voted that they should all be put to death, and a ship departed with these orders. It was with great difficulty that a more moderate group in the Assembly secured a rehearing of the question

and succeeded in inducing the people to modify their barbarous action to the condemnation and execution of the ringleaders only. A second ship then overtook the first barely in time to save from death the entire body of the citizens of Mitylene.

§598. Cleon the tanner

In spite of such revolts Athenian naval supremacy continued; but as the war dragged on, the payment of army and fleet reduced Athenian funds to a very low state. Cleon the tanner was a man of much energy and a good deal of financial ability. He succeeded in having an income tax introduced, and later on the tribute of the Ægean cities was raised. But having always been a manufacturer, he lacked all military experience. For years the operations on both sides were in most cases utterly insignificant. This is best seen in Cleon's siege and capture of *four hundred* Spartans on one of the islands on the west coast of Greece—a disaster which made a great impression and, in view of some other reverses, led the Spartans to sue for peace! Later in an absurdly mismanaged expedition on the northern coast of the Ægean, Cleon lost his army of fifteen hundred men and his own life.

§599. The first ten years of the war, and the Peace of Nicias (421 B.C.)

The attack of the allies on Athens did not succeed in breaking up her empire and overthrowing her leadership of the Ægean cities. It was the devastation wrought by the plague which had seriously affected her. Athens and the whole Greek world were demoralized and weakened. The contest had in it no longer the inspiration of a noble struggle such as the Greeks had maintained against Persia. Unprecedented brutality, like that at first adopted toward Mitylene, gave the struggle a savagery and a lack of respect for the enemy which completely obscured all finer issues, if there were any such involved in the war. With Cleon gone, Athenian leadership fell into the hands of a wealthy and noble citizen named Nicias, a man of no ability. When ten years of indecisive warfare had passed, Nicias arranged a peace to be kept for fifty years. Each contestant agreed to

give up all new conquests and to retain only old possessions or subject cities (see map II, page 391).

58. THIRD PELOPONNESIAN WAR AND DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

§600. Difficulties in maintaining the new peace

Meantime serious difficulties arose in carrying out the conditions of the peace. One of the northern subject cities of Athens which had gone over to Sparta refused to return to Athenian allegiance. Athens took the questionable ground that Sparta should force the unwilling city to obey the terms of peace. It was at this juncture that Athens especially needed such guidance as a statesman like Pericles could have furnished. She was obliged to depend upon the feeble leadership of Nicias and the energetic but unprincipled Alcibiades.

§601. Alcibiades brings on war again

Nicias continued to urge a conciliatory attitude toward Sparta, but he failed of election as strategus. On the other hand, the gifted and reckless Alcibiades, seeing a great opportunity for a brilliant career, did all that he could to excite the war party in Athens. He was elected strategus, and, in spite of the fact that troubles at home had forced Sparta into a treaty of alliance with Athens, Alcibiades was able to carry the Assembly with him. He then involved Athens in an alliance with Argos against Sparta. In this way Attica, exhausted with plague and ten years of warfare, was enticed into a life-and-death struggle which was to prove final.

§602. Third Peloponnesian War; Sicilian expedition


Several years of ill-planned military and naval operations followed the fruitless peace of Nicias. The Spartans did not at once respond with hostilities and sent no army into Attica. Alcibiades at length persuaded the Athenians to plan a great joint expedition of army and navy against Sicily, where the mighty city of Syracuse, founded as a colony of Corinth, was leading in the oppression of certain Western cities in alliance with Athens. The Athenians placed Alcibiades and Nicias in command of the expedition.

§603. Arrest of. Alcibiades and his flight to Sparta

Just as the fleet was about to sail, certain sacred images in Athens were impiously mutilated, and the deed was attributed to Alcibiades. In spite of his demand for an immediate trial, the Athenians postponed the case until his return from Sicily. When the fleet reached Italy, however, the Athenian people, with their usual inability to follow any consistent plan and also desiring to take Alcibiades at a great disadvantage, suddenly recalled him for trial. This procedure not only deprived the expedition of its only able leader but also gave Alcibiades an opportunity to desert to the Spartans, which he promptly did. His advice to the Spartans now proved fatal to the Athenians.

§604. Incompetence of Nicias

The appearance of the huge Athenian fleet off their coast struck dismay into the hearts of the Syracusans, but Nicias entirely failed to see the importance of immediate attack before the Syracusans could recover and make preparations for the defense of their city. He wasted the early days of the campaign in ill-planned maneuvers, only winning a barren victory over the Syracusan land forces. When Nicias was



Plan of the Siege of Syracuse

finally induced by the second general in command to begin the siege of the city, courage had returned to the Syracusans, and their defense was well organized.

§605. Athenian siege unsuccessful

The Athenians now built a siege wall behind Syracuse nearly across the point of land on which the city was situated, in order to cut it entirely off from the outside world. The spirit of the Syracusans was much depressed, and surrender seemed not far off. Just at this point Gylippus, a Spartan leader and his troops, sent by the advice of Alcibiades, succeeded in passing the Athenian lines and gained entrance to the city. The courage of the Syracusans was at once restored. The Athenians were thrown upon the defensive. Meantime the Syracusans had also organized a fleet. The Athenian fleet had entered the harbor, and in these narrow quarters they were unable to maneuver or to take advantage of their superior seamanship. After some Athenian success at first, the fleet of Syracuse was victorious.

§606. Reinforced Athenians repulsed

There was now no prospect of the capture of the city, and Nicias would have withdrawn, but the leaders at home would not allow it. In spite of renewed Spartan invasion, the blinded democratic leaders sent out another fleet and more land forces to reinforce Nicias. No Greek state had ever mustered such power and sent it far across the waters. All Greece watched the spectacle with amazement. A night assault by the reinforced Athenians failed with large losses, and the position of the whole expedition at once became a dangerous one.

§607. Capture of Athenian fleet and army before Syracuse (413 B.C.)

With disaster staring them in the face there was nothing for the Athenians to do but withdraw. But just at this point, an eclipse of the moon occurred, and the superstitious Nicias insisted on waiting for another more favorable moon. This month's delay was fatal to the Athenians. The Syracusans blockaded the channel to the sea and completely shut up the Athenian fleet within the harbor, so that an attempt to break through and escape disastrously failed. The desperate Athenian army, abandoning sick and wounded, too late

endeavored to escape into the interior, but was overtaken and forced to surrender. The Syracusans treated the captured Athenians with savage barbarity. After executing the commanding generals, they took the prisoners, seven thousand in number, and sold them into slavery or threw them into the stone quarries of the city (Figure 192), where most of them miserably perished, Thus the Athenian expedition was completely destroyed (413 B.C.). This disaster, together with the earlier ravages of the plague, brought Athens near the end of her resources.




Figure 192. Stone Quarries of Syracuse in which the Athenians were Imprisoned

We look across the deep quarry and the Small Harbor to the ancient island of Ortygia (see map, page 439). It is now a cape, occupied by the modern city of which we can see the buildings. The quarries are overgrown with ivy and masked with beautiful green foliage. Here the seven thousand Athenians captured by the Syracusans (§607) were imprisoned without sufficient water and provisions, and here most of them died.

§608. Spartan garrison in Attica

Heretofore Sparta had stood more or less aloof, seemingly unwilling to break the peace of Nicias, and had not invaded Attica. But now seeing the unprotected condition of Athens, after the dispatch of the Sicilian expedition, Sparta again invaded Attica and, on the advice of Alcibiades, occupied

the town of Decelea,[64] almost within sight of Athens. Here the Spartans established a permanent fort held by a strong garrison, and thus placed Athens in a state of perpetual siege. All agriculture ceased, and the Athenians lived on imported grain. The people now understood the folly of having sent away on a distant expedition the ships and the men that should have been kept at home to repel the attacks of a powerful and still uncrippled foe.

§609. Internal troubles of the Athenian Empire

After these disasters the Athenian Empire began to show signs of breaking up. The failure of the democracy in the management of the war enabled the nobles to denounce popular rule as unsuccessful. The nobles regained power for a time; violence and bloodshed within were added to the dangerous assaults of the enemy from without. The finances were in a desperate condition. The tribute, already raised to the breaking point, was abolished and a customs duty of five per cent was levied on all goods exported or imported. The plan was a success and brought in a larger income than the tribute. But the measure did not unite nor quiet the discontented communities of which the Empire was made up. One after another they fell away. Spartan warships sailed about in the Ægean, aiding the rebels, who had of course dared to revolt only on promise of such assistance from Sparta.

§610. Persia aids the Peloponnesians against Athens

To add to the Athenian distress, the powerful Persian satrap in western Asia Minor was supporting the Spartan fleet with money. Indeed, both Athens and Sparta had long been negotiating with Persia for aid, and Sparta had recognized Persian rule over the Greek cities of Asia. The Greek islands and the cities of Asia Minor which had once united in the Delian League with Athens to throw off Persian rule were now combining with Sparta and Persia against Athens. Thus the former union of the Greeks in a

64 On this account the war with Sparta which now followed, lasting nine years (from 413 to 404 B.C.), is often called the "Decelean War" (see map, page 401).

heroic struggle against the Asiatic enemy had given way to a disgraceful scramble for Persian support and favor.

§611. Alcibiades recovers command of the Athenian fleet (411 B.C.)

Meantime Alcibiades, under the protection of the Persian satrap, had himself encouraged the revolters against Athens, hoping that her distress would finally oblige her to recall him and seek his aid. He was not disappointed. The small fleet which the Athenians were still able to put into the fight called upon Alcibiades for help, and finally put itself under his command, without any authorization from Athens. In several conflicts, chiefly through the skill of Alcibiades, the Peloponnesian fleet was finally completely destroyed, and Athens regained the command of the sea.

§612. Restoration of Alcibiades (407 B.C.)

Sparta now made offers of peace, but Alcibiades skillfully used the war sentiment in the fleet against their acceptance, and the democratic leaders in power at Athens also refused to make peace. Alcibiades was then (407 B.C.) elected strategus and legally gained command of the fleet which he had already been leading for four years. At the head of a triumphant procession he entered Athens again for the first time since he had left it for Sicily eight years before. He was solemnly purified from the religious curse which rested upon him, and his fortune, which had been confiscated, was returned to him.

§613. Fall and death of Alcibiades

It now needed only the abilities of such a leader as Alcibiades to accomplish the union of the distracted Greek states, and the foundation of a great Greek nation. At this supreme moment, however, Alcibiades lacked the courage to seize the government, and the opportunity never returned again. When he put to sea again a slight defeat, inflicted on a part of his fleet when he was not present, cost him the favor of the fickle Athenians. When they failed to reëlect him strategus he retired to a castle which he had kept in readiness on the Hellespont. He never saw his native land again and died in exile, the victim of a Persian dagger.

The Athenians had now lost their ablest leader again, but they continued the war on the sea as best they

§614. Athenian victory of Arginusæ, execution of the commanders (406 B.C.)

could. They won another important victory over a new Peloponnesian fleet on the coast of Asia Minor by the little islands of Arginusæ. As the battle ended a storm arose which prevented the commanders from saving the Athenian survivors clinging to the wreckage. For this accident the Athenian commanders were accused of criminal neglect before the Assembly and condemned to death. In spite of all that could be done, six of the eight naval commanders were executed, including the young Pericles, a son of the great statesman. The other two commanders had been wise enough to flee from such justice as they might expect at the hands of the Athenian democracy.

§615. Capture of the Athenian fleet at the battle of Ægospotami (405 B.C.)

Athens now suffered worse than ever before for lack of competent commanders. The fleet numbering about one hundred and eighty triremes was placed in command of a group of officers, each of whom was to lead for a day at a time. The democratic leaders who had made this absurd arrangement watched the fleet sail out to continue a war which they themselves were prolonging by again refusing Spartan proffers of peace. For several days in succession the Athenians sailed out from their station near the river called Ægospotami on the Hellespont, and offered battle to the Peloponnesian fleet lying in a neighboring harbor. But the Peloponnesians refused battle. On their return from these maneuvers each day, the Athenians left their ships along the beach and themselves went ashore. Alcibiades from his neighboring castle, where he still was, came down and pointed out to the Athenian commanders the great danger they ran in leaving the fleet in this condition so near the enemy. His advice received no attention. The able Spartan, Lysander, the commander of the Peloponnesian fleet, seeing this daily procedure, waited until the Athenians had gone ashore and left their ships as usual. Then, sailing over, he surprised and captured practically the whole Athenian fleet.

At last, twenty-seven years after Pericles had provoked the war with Sparta, the resources of Athens were exhausted. Not a man slept on the night when the terrible news of

§616. Surrender of Athens and fall of the Athenian Empire (404 B.C.)

final ruin reached Athens. It was soon confirmed by the appearance of Lysander's fleet blockading the Piræus. The grain ships from the Black Sea could no longer reach the port of Athens. The Spartan king pitched his camp in the grove of the Academy (§558) and called on the city to surrender. For some months the stubborn democratic leaders refused to accept terms of peace which meant the complete destruction of Athenian power. But the pinch of hunger finally convinced the Assembly, and the city surrendered. The Long Walls and the fortifications of the Piræus were torn down, the remnant of the fleet was handed over to Sparta, all foreign possessions were given up, and Athens was forced to enter the Spartan League. These hard conditions saved the city from the complete destruction demanded by Corinth. Thus the century which had begun so gloriously for Athens with the repulse of Persia, the century which under the leadership of such men as Themistocles and Pericles had seen her rise to supremacy in all that was best and noblest in Greek life, closed with the annihilation of the Athenian Empire (404 B.C.).

QUESTIONS

SECTION 57. How did Athens treat the subject states of her Empire? What was now her policy regarding citizenship? regarding lawsuits in the subject states? How did these states now feel toward Athens? How did the states outside the Athenian Empire feel? What was the result? Who were the enemies of Athens in this war? What were her resources?

What was Pericles' plan of campaign? What disaster overtook Athens? How did this affect the fortunes of Pericles? By what associations had he displeased the people? What was the result? What young leader now came forward? What kind of leadership did the Assembly now furnish? Give an example. What business man now tried to lead the nation? How did he succeed? Were the military operations

of the war on a large scale? What was the result of ten years' war? Who arranged the peace? When?

SECTION 58. Who was chiefly responsible for the reopening of the war? What great expedition did the Athenians plan? Who were the commanders? What prevented Alcibiades from going? Tell the story of the expedition and its end. What did Sparta now do? What was now the internal condition of the Athenian Empire? What part did Persia play in the war? What can you state of the restoration of Alcibiades to office? What was the result? How did the Athenians treat their naval commanders? What was the result? What was the situation of Athens after the loss of her fleet? What conditions did Sparta make? Contrast the beginning and the end of the fifth century in Athenian history.

NOTE. The tailpiece below shows us the theater of Epidaurus, which is unusually instructive because it is the best preserved of the Greek theaters. Although it was built late in the fourth century B.C., we see that the orchestra circle is still complete and has not been cut into by later stage arrangements behind it as at Athens (Figure 189).

